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I. Introduction
Numerous studies have found that the stock market
reacts negatively to conversion-forcing calls of con-
vertible securities. The prevailing explanation is that
managers call in-the-money convertibles in order to
force the holders of these convertible securities to con-
vert to equity and therefore share with existing stock-
holders in an anticipated decline in the firm’s value
and that, knowing this, market participants view a
conversion-forcing call as a negative signal.
We test and reject this signaling hypothesis. Ex-
amining 298 conversion-forcing calls of convertible
bonds between 1/1/85 and 12/31/93, we find no evi-
dence that managers of calling firms view the firm’s
common equity as overvalued and no evidence that
stock analysts view a conversion-forcing call as bad
news. Instead our evidence supports the opposite con-
clusion that both managers and professional analysts
think the calling firm’s future prospects are quite pos-
itive. Thus, our evidence tends to support the alter-
native hypothesis of Mazzeo and Moore (1992), Byrd
* We acknowledge the helpful comments or assistance of Jeffrey
Donaldson, Mike Gombola, Rick Meyer, participants in the finance
workshops at Drexel University, the University of Oklahoma, and
the University of South Florida, participants in the Financial Man-
agement Association European Conference, and an anonymous
referee.
We test and reject the hy-
pothesis that managers
call in-the-money con-
vertibles when they view
a decline in the value of
the firm as likely. Incon-
sistent with this view, we
find that insiders gener-
ally buy equity before
conversion-forcing calls.
Also, analysts tend to
raise their earnings fore-
casts following a call.
Thus, our evidence sup-
ports the alternative hy-
pothesis that the price de-
cline immediately
following conversion-
forcing calls is a purely
transitory decline caused
by the anticipated in-
crease in the supply of
equity. Indeed, our evi-
dence confirms that the
initial price decline is re-
versed in the weeks fol-
lowing the
announcement.
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and Moore (1996), and Howe, Lin, and Singh (1998) that the price decline
immediately following a conversion-forcing convertible call is a purely tran-
sitory event caused by the sudden increase in the supply of equity. Confirming
Mazzeo and Moore (1992), we further find that the equity price decline which
accompanies the call is completely reversed over the next 2–3 weeks.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we review existing
theories and evidence on conversion-forcing calls of convertible securities and
outline our tests of the signaling hypothesis. Our data are described in Section
III. In Section IV, we test whether managers who call and force conversion
view their firm’s equity as overvalued, while in Section V we test whether
stock analysts view a conversion-forcing call as bad news. In Section VI we
conclude.
II. The Signaling Hypothesis
A. The Hypothesis and Its Critics
In early theoretical work on convertible security calls, Ingersoll (1977a, 1977b)
and Brennan and Schwartz (1977) hypothesized that, in the interest of existing
stockholders, firms should call a convertible bond as soon as (or almost as
soon as) the bond’s conversion value exceeded its call price, thus forcing the
bondholders to convert to stock.1 By forcing conversion, they reasoned, man-
agers would eliminate the bondholder’s option to hold bonds, instead of stock,
if the price of the firm’s equity should decline in the future. Since all firms
with in-the-money convertibles should call, their theory implied that a call
was not an informative event.
However, numerous empirical studies quickly established two facts. One,
in contradiction of this prescription, many firms delay calling until well after
their bonds are in the money.2 Two, the price of a calling firm’s equity reacts
negatively to the call.3 Harris and Raviv (1985) advanced a theory to explain
both phenomena. Since firms whose managers think their equity is likely to
decline in value in the future would have the most reason to call, Harris and
1. Bondholders have roughly 30 days in which to decide whether or not to convert. Conse-
quently, if the price of the firm’s equity declines, they can choose cash instead of stock. To avoid
this, Ingersoll (1977b) argued that the firm should delay calling until the conversion value
exceeded the call price by a small safety premium. Asquith (1995) has argued that this premium
is really fairly large.
2. See Ingersoll (1977a), Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991), and Singh, Cowan, and
Nayar (1991). While Asquith (1995) reports that most firms call fairly quickly after the conversion
value exceeds the call price by 20%, he examines only firms that did in fact call. Ederington,
Caton, and Campbell (1997) and Byrd et al. (1998) find that most firms delay longer. Byrd et
al. (1998) argue that a conversion-forcing call transfers value from holders of convertibles to
common stockholders only if the market price of the convertibles exceeds their conversion value
and that the market price should rise in anticipation of the call. They find no discernible option
value in the prices of convertible preferred stocks once they are in the money and callable.
3. Mikkelson (1981), Ofer and Natarajan (1987), Campbell et al. (1991), Singh et al. (1991),
Mazzeo and Moore (1992), Asquith (1995), Byrd and Moore (1996), and Kadapakkam and Tang
(1996).
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Raviv reasoned that by refraining from calling, firms that do not expect a
decline in equity values could distinguish themselves from firms that do. They
argued that a separating equilibrium could arise in which only those firms
whose managers viewed their equity as overvalued would call. Knowing this,
a conversion-forcing call should be interpreted as bad news by market
participants.
Initial evidence by Ofer and Natarajan (1987), who found that earnings
growth declined sharply following in-the-money convertible calls, strongly
supported this signaling hypothesis. Indeed, Ofer and Natarajan found that
market prices seemed to impound only a minor portion of the full information
in conversion-forcing calls. While the value of equity fell 1%–2% at the time
of the call, abnormal returns of 11% were observed over the first full year
following a call and an astonishing mean abnormal return of 72.6% was
documented over the first 5 years.
However, the Ofer and Natarajan evidence was soon challenged. Campbell
et al. (1991) pointed out that since convertible bonds are issued out of the
money while conversion-forcing calls are in the money, by definition firms
making conversion-forcing calls must have experienced positive returns prior
to the call. Both Ofer and Natarajan’s abnormal returns and earnings growth
measures were based on this precall period since they compared postcall with
precall earnings growth and used a market model estimated over the precall
period to calculate abnormal returns. Campbell et al. found that, while calling
firms tended to be firms that had experienced particularly strong earnings
growth prior to the call, their postcall earnings growth was no lower than at
other firms in the same industry. Campbell et al. further found that when
abnormal returns were calculated using a procedure that was not dependent
on precall returns, the large apparent negative postcall abnormal returns
vanished.4
Mazzeo and Moore (1992), Byrd and Moore (1996), and Kadapakkam and
Tang (1996) have presented evidence that the decline in equity values im-
mediately following a conversion-forcing call is only temporary—that over
the next month or so the firm’s equity tends to rebound.5 Consequently, they
argue that the decline in equity value is only a temporary dip caused by the
anticipated increase in the number of shares on the market.6 Further, Byrd
and Moore (1996) find that the Value Line Investment Survey actually in-
creases their forecasts of the firm’s earnings following a conversion-forcing
4. Along the same lines, Ederington et al. (1997) found that earnings growth at calling firms
was not significantly higher than that at firms with in-the-money convertibles that did not call.
Emery et al. (1994) found that calling firms grow faster than noncalling firms and argued that
firms call to increase the equity on their balance sheets.
5. A price rebound also appears in Mikkelson’s original data, although it was not emphasized.
6. Howe et al. (1998) posit that many holders of convertible preferred stock choose to sell
rather than convert to common equity. Consistent with this, they find that at the time of the call
announcement, the price of convertible preferred stock falls even more than the price of the
common so that market makers can make money by buying the preferred, shorting the common
(driving down its price), converting, and then delivering the common.
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call of its convertible bonds, while Shastri and Shastri (1996) find no evidence
that analysts reduce their earnings forecasts following conversion-forcing calls
of preferred stock as the signaling hypothesis would imply.
B. Testing the Signaling Hypothesis
We test the signaling hypothesis by testing both whether managers at calling
firms expect a decline in the firms’ market value and whether market pro-
fessionals interpret a conversion-forcing call as bad news. Using a sample of
298 conversion-forcing convertible bond calls over the period 1/1/85 through
12/31/93, we examine how stock analysts adjust their forecasts of future
earnings following a conversion-forcing call and whether insiders are buying
or selling. If managers call convertible bonds because they think their firm’s
equity is overpriced, as the signaling hypothesis posits, then in their own
interest, we should observe these officials selling equity prior to and concurrent
with the call. However, our evidence indicates just the opposite, that is, insiders
(firm officers in particular) are strong net purchasers of equity in the months
just before a call and continue to accumulate equity following the call. Indeed,
insiders purchase more stock than normal in the months just before a con-
version-forcing call.
Likewise, if a conversion-forcing call is viewed by stock analysts as sig-
naling that management expects bad times ahead, then stock analysts should
adjust their earnings forecasts downward soon after the call. We do not observe
this. Instead, our evidence indicates that analysts tend unexpectedly to raise
their forecasts. As noted above, some evidence on this issue has been presented
by Byrd and Moore (1996) and Shastri and Shastri (1996), but the former
examine only Value Line forecasts and the latter only preferred stock calls.
More important, we separate unexpected earnings forecast revisions from those
that are predictable.
In summary, we find no evidence that managers of calling firms expect a
decline in the firm’s market value and no evidence that market professionals
interpret a call this way.
III. Data and Descriptive Results
For this study, we collected a sample of all calls of convertible bonds between
1/1/85 and 12/31/93 from Standard and Poor’s Bond Guide, a total of 552
convertible bond/calls. In order to obtain a sample in which there are no
unusual reasons to call or not call, we dropped from our sample: (1) zero-
coupon (or deep discount) bonds, (2) bonds convertible into something other
than the firm’s common equity, and (3) bonds with puts or other embedded
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options, such as Liquid Yield Option Notes (LYONs).7 A total of 39 bonds
were eliminated for these reasons. Since the signaling hypothesis applies only
to conversion-forcing calls, we also eliminated 106 bond/calls from the sample
because they were out of the money at the time of the call, that is, the
conversion value of the bonds was less than the call price. Finally we dropped
109 calls because no call announcement date was reported on the Lexis-Nexis
database. The resulting sample consisted of 298 conversion-forcing calls.
Descriptive statistics on calling firms are reported in table 1. For comparison,
we formed a matched sample of noncalling firms by choosing at random a
noncalling firm (which might or might not have convertible debt) with the
same two-digit SIC code as the calling firm. As shown in panel A of table
1, as compared with other firms in the industry, firms that call in-the-money
convertible debt tend to be somewhat smaller, more levered, and considerably
faster growing. As reported in panel B of table 1, while 54 different two-digit
SIC codes are represented in our sample, a large number of convertible issuing
and calling firms are concentrated in the financial and electronic industries.
The day the call appeared on the news wires according to Lexis-Nexis
(which may be after the market closes) is designated as day 0. If the call is
reported in the Wall Street Journal, the announcement usually appears on day
1, but delays are sometimes observed and all calls are not reported in the
Wall Street Journal. For this reason, we use two announcement windows:
(0,1) and (0,3).
While the phenomenon has been very well documented heretofore, we first
confirm that conversion-forcing calls tend to be accompanied by a decline in
stock values. Particular care must be exercised in measuring abnormal returns
around these calls. As noted above, Campbell et al. (1991) showed that since
convertible bonds are issued out of the money but called in the money, those
firms making conversion-forcing calls tend to be firms that have experienced
abnormally high positive returns over the precall period. Consequently, we
use a postcall period, specifically days (251,506) and close-to-close return
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to
estimate a market model. Of the 298 conversion-forcing bond calls in our
sample, 271 have sufficient data on CRSP to estimate a market model over
this window. Using this postevent market model, abnormal returns and cu-
mulative abnormal returns are calculated in the usual manner.
As shown in table 2, cumulative abnormal returns over the period from
day 250 thru 1 are a substantial and highly significant 37.23%. While
impressive, positive precall abnormal returns were expected since firms mak-
7. Since we investigate management’s motives for calling and what motives the market infers
from a call, we desire a sample with no unusual motives for calling besides those discussed in
the literature. While all convertible bonds are puttable for equity, a few (like LYONs) are also
puttable for cash. Since this injects a different motive for calling, we delete them. In the case
of zero-coupons and LYONs, the conversion ratio changes over time, so managers might wish
to call before the conversion ratio rises.
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TABLE 1 Characteristics of Firms Making Conversion-Forcing Calls of Convertible Bonds
Comparative Means Calling Firms
Calling
Firms
Matched
Firms t-Statistic Median SD
A. Financial characteristics:
Total assets (in millions) $4,359 $5,709 1.39 $893 $9,929
Market capitalization (in millions) $1,578 $2,882 2.56 $566 $3,794
Total debt as a percent of total assets 33.6% 27.5% 3.76 31.0% 16.8%
Tobin’s Q 1.052 .962 .88 .942 .743
Return on assets (ROA) 3.91% 3.88% .06 4.31% 6.08%
Annualized growth rate in total as-
sets over last 3 years 17.8% 10.9% 4.22 14.8% 17.6%
SIC
Code
Number
of Firms
B. Classification of calling firms by
SIC code (industry description):*
Financial holding companies and
other financial 67 34
Computer equipment and industrial
machinery 35 26
Electrical equipment and components 36 19
Business services 73 17
Chemicals and allied products 28 12
Note.—Descriptive statistics are reported for firms making conversion-forcing calls of convertible bonds during the period 1/1/85–12/31/93. For comparison, each calling firm is matched
with a noncalling firm chosen at random from the same industry.
* We report the five two-digit SIC codes with the most companies calling convertible debt.
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TABLE 2 The Market Response to Conversion-Forcing Calls of Convertible
Bonds
Day or Window Mean AR-CAR (%) z-Statistic % Positive z-Statistic
10 .13 1.38 49.08 .68
9 .23 1.53 50.55 1.17
8 .26 1.50 52.40 1.78
7 .12 1.26 48.71 .56
6 .05 .45 49.82 .93
5 .03 .5 46.13 .29
4 .22 1.55 48.71 .56
3 .28 2.25* 50.92 1.29
2 .02 .07 48.34 .44
1 .11 .06 46.49 .17
0 .44 3.27** 45.02 .66
1 .26 3.33** 41.33 1.87
2 .29 2.43* 40.59 2.12*
3 .18 1.78 45.39 .53
4 .19 1.05 46.49 .17
5 .06 .89 50.55 1.17
6 .18 .95 49.08 .68
7 .06 .38 47.60 .20
8 .09 .45 46.86 .05
9 .14 1.43 49.82 .93
10 .14 1.34 46.13 .29
(250,1) 37.23 16.75** 78.23 10.30**
(0,1) .70 4.67** 38.01 2.97**
(0,3) 1.17 5.40** 35.79 3.70**
(4,10) .86 2.45* 52.77 1.90*
(4,20) 2.55 4.34** 60.15 4.33**
(21,250) 6.70 3.92** 57.56 3.48**
Note.—Mean abnormal returns (AR) and mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding the an-
nouncements of 271 conversion-forcing convertible bond calls over the period 1/1/85–12/31/93 are reported.
Abnormal returns are calculated using a market model estimated over the period (251,506) where 0 is the
announcement day as reported in news wire reports from the Lexis-Nexis database.
* Mean ARs or CARs that are significantly different from zero at the .05 level in two-tailed tests or
percentages of positive abnormal returns, which are significantly different from .5 in two-tailed tests.
** Mean ARs or CARs that are significantly different from zero at the .01 level in two-tailed tests or
percentages of positive abnormal returns, which are significantly different from .5 in two-tailed tests.
ing conversion-forcing calls must by definition have experienced price in-
creases in the period between bond issuance and call. This illustrates the
danger in using precall benchmarks to judge the reaction to conversion-forcing
calls.
As reported in table 2 and illustrated in figure 1, calling firms experience
an average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of .70% over the (0,1) call
window and 1.17% over the (0,3) window. With z-values of 4.67 and
5.40, respectively, both are significant at the .01 level. Also, 64.2% of the
calling firms experience negative abnormal returns over the (0,3) window,
a figure that is significantly greater than 50% at the .01 level.
As noted above, Mazzeo and Moore (1992), Byrd and Moore (1996), and
Kadapakkam and Tang (1996) observe that the stock price tends to recover
following this initial decline. As shown in table 2 and figure 1, we confirm
this finding in our much larger sample. The CAR over the period (4,10)
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Fig. 1.—Stock returns surrounding conversion-forcing convertible bond calls
is .86% with Over the period (4,20), the CAR is 2.55%,zp 2.45.
with which is significant at the .01 level. Moreover, 60% of callingzp 4.34,
firms experience positive abnormal returns over the (4,20) window.
Clearly, the decline in stock values associated with the convertible bond call
is purely temporary. Indeed the positive abnormal return over the (4,20)
window is over twice as large as the negative abnormal return over the (0,3)
window associated with the call. This finding that the negative returns ob-
served immediately following conversion-forcing calls are totally reversed
over the next 2–3 weeks is inconsistent with the signaling hypothesis but is
consistent with the price pressure hypothesis of Mazzeo and Moore (1992)
and Byrd and Moore (1996).
IV. Do Managers of Calling Firms Think Their Equity Is
Overvalued?
As explained above, the traditional explanation for the negative market re-
action to conversion-forcing calls is that firms call convertible securities only
if management foresees a strong possibility that the value of the firm’s equity
will decline in the future. According to this theory, managers who think their
equity is overvalued call in the interest of existing stockholders in order to
force the bondholders to share in the coming decline.8 If management does
8. If they fail to call and the equity price declines, then the convertible bonds may fall out of
the money, so managers call to eliminate the bondholders’ option to continue to hold the bonds.
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not foresee such a decline, then according to this signaling hypothesis, they
will refrain from calling in order to avoid sending a negative signal and to
distinguish themselves from the calling firms.
If indeed managers of calling firms view their equity as overvalued, then,
in their own interest, they should be divesting their personal stock holdings.
Of course, counterposed to this incentive is the fact that sections 17(a) and
17(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10(b)-5
prohibit trading on material inside information by insiders, who are defined
by section 16(b) of the Exchange Act as officers, directors, and owners of
10% or more of the firm’s equity. However, only trading on “material” inside
information is prohibited where “material” has effectively been interpreted as
information that results in a substantial change in equity prices when it is
made public (Arshadi, Eyssell, and Kempf 1993). For instance, Meulbroek
(1992) finds that in her sample of insider trading charges brought by the SEC,
the average absolute 1-day price change when the inside information is made
public is 18.5%. She further reports that 79% of the charges involve trading
prior to corporate control or takeover events and virtually all the rest involve
trading before bankruptcy or major earnings announcements. Given the figures
in table 2, it appears that the reaction to convertible bond calls falls far below
the material event threshold, and we can find no instance in which anyone
has been charged with insider trading because they sold stock prior to such
a call.
While the evidence is mixed on whether significant numbers of insiders
trade prior to specific major announcements such as takeovers or bankruptcies,9
it is well established that insiders are able to exploit their information ad-
vantage in less dramatic situations. Evidence shows that insiders tend to buy
before stock price increases and sell before stock price declines (Jaffe 1974;
Seyhun 1986, 1992). Consequently, we can use insider purchases and sales
as a proxy for how insiders, officers in particular, view their firms’ equity.
Our basic measure of insider trading is the number of net trades or purchases
of firm i’s equity by insiders defined as , where NPi rep-NT p NP  NSi i i
resents the number of insider purchases of firm i’s equity during a period of
time, and NSi is the number of sales as reported to the SEC.10 The number
NTi is calculated separately for 12 30-day periods relative to the call date.
For instance, NT(30,1)i represents net purchases of firm i’s equity by
insiders over the 30 days from day 30 to day 1 where day 0 is the day
of the call announcement according to Lexis-Nexis. Similarly NT(l,30)i
represents net purchases over the 30 days from day 1 through day 30.
9. For instance, Loderer and Sheehan (1989) and Gosnell, Keown, and Pinkerton (1992) find
no significant insider selling prior to bankruptcy announcements, while Seyhun and Bradley
(1997) do. However, Penman (1982), Karpoff and Lee (1991), and Seyhun (1992) all find evidence
of insider trading before acquisition, new issue, and earnings announcements, respectively.
10. Required to report their transactions to the SEC by section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 are corporate officers, directors, and outsiders holding 10% or more of
the firm’s equity.
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Like most studies, we base our measure on the number of trades, rather than
number of shares, since large stockholders tend to trade in larger amounts
than the supposedly better informed officers and since fears of legal penalties
may discourage large transactions. Our data set includes only pure purchases
and sales; in other words, insider trades associated with gifts, compensation
plans, or option exercises as well as any trades due to conversion of con-
vertibles held by insiders are excluded. The number NTi is measured separately
for (1) all insiders, (2) officers (since they presumably have better information
than large outside stockholders), and (3) top executives defined as presidents,
CEOs, board chairmen, and inside directors (since they should have the best
information of all). Of our 298 convertible bond/calls, the SEC tapes contain
data on insider trades for 247.11
Mean values of the NT(x,x30)i, that is, NT(x,x 30)p
for values of x in 30-day increments from 180 daysI (1/I)NT(x,x 30) ,ip0 i
before the conversion-forcing convertible call through 180 days after are re-
ported in table 3. In table 3, we also report the percentage of firms with
positive net insider purchases ignoring those firm/months in which there was
no insider trading in firm i’s stock.
As reported in table 3, there is no evidence of insider selling prior to
conversion-forcing calls. Instead, we observe net insider purchases every
month prior to conversion-forcing calls. For instance, at the average calling
firm, there are 2.923 insider purchases over the 90-day period prior to a
conversion-forcing call and only .907 insider sales so NT(30,1)p
a figure that is significantly different from zero at the .01 level. More-2.016,
over at 69.7% of the observed firms, more insiders are buying than are selling
over the 90 days just prior to a conversion-forcing call, and at 73.1% more
insiders are buying than selling over the 30 days just before the call.12 Both
figures are significantly different from 50% at the .01 level.
As explained above, some insiders may be more informed than others, and
the most informed are likely to be company officers and especially top ex-
ecutives. The separate figures for these two subgroups reveal that they too
are net buyers, and this is particularly true in the months immediately sur-
rounding the call. Over the 90 days prior to conversion-forcing calls, NT
averages 2.016 ( ) for all insiders, 2.263 ( ) for officers,tp 3.652 tp 5.424
and .923 ( ) for top executives.tp 3.242
While it is clear that insiders are not divesting their ownership in con-
vertible-calling firms, it is possible that the net purchases documented in table
3 merely represent the normal course of affairs. In other words, these insiders
might normally be even more active net purchasers of their company’s stock.
11. Our data samples differ slightly between tables 1 through 5 because, of our 298 firms, 27
are not on the CRSP tapes, 51 are not on the insider trading tapes, and 20 are not on the IBES
tapes, with considerable overlap between these three sets. When we repeat tables 1 through 5
using only firms in all three data sets, there is virtually no change in the results.
12. The mean NTt values in table 3 are based on all 247 firms, including those at which there
was no insider trading in month t. The percentages are based on those with insider trading only.
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TABLE 3 Insider Trading Activity Surrounding Conversion-Forcing Calls of
Convertible Bonds
Days Relative to Call
All Insiders All Officers Top Executives
NT % Positive NT % Positive NT % Positive
(180,151) .429* 64.368** .473** 64.286** .067 52.273
(2.381) [.002] (2.816) [.004] (.861) [.761]
(150,121) .263 60.759 .432** 64.103* .120 52.632
(1.569) [.054] (3.256) [.017] (1.329) [.871]
(120,91) .660** 76.344** .712** 77.419** .383** 70.909**
(4.005) [.000] (4.621) [.000] (3.799) [.003]
(90,61) .684* 73.256** .786** 72.152** .440 59.574
(2.480) [.000] (3.300) [.000] (1.909) [.243]
(60,31) .725** 68.750** .683** 69.333** .234* 60.000
(3.084) [.001] (3.706) [.001] (2.353) [.233]
(30,1) .607* 73.118** .794** 75.294** .249** 62.500
(2.380) [.000] (3.926) [.000] (2.842) [.079]
(1,30) .713** 68.675** .770** 70.513** .402** 70.213**
(3.724) [.000] (4.225) [.000] (3.540) [.008]
(31,60) .615** 61.111* .745** 65.476** .287* 57.895
(2.844) [.013] (3.803) [.001] (2.113) [.229]
(61,90) .316 62.500* .300 64.474* .033 54.348
(1.806) [.033] (1.734) [.015] (.256) [.659]
(91,120) .741** 62.500* .506** 61.446* .163 49.057
(2.830) [.013] (3.045) [.026] (1.577) [1.000]
(121,150) .494* 57.143 .428* 57.647 .062 48.276
(2.400) [.208] (2.481) [.193] (.568) [.896]
(151,180) .449** 58.065 .457** 58.889 .077 50.000
(2.920) [.117] (3.023) [.089] (.752) [1.000]
(90,1) 2.016** 69.737** 2.263** 69.178** .923** 57.692
(3.652) [.000] (5.424) [.000] (3.242) [.115]
Number of observations 247 243 209
Note.—We report mean net insider trades, NT, defined as the number of insider purchases  the number
of insider sales. t-statistics are in parentheses below each mean. We also report the percentage of firms in
which insider purchases exceed insider sales, ignoring those firms with no insider trades during the 30-day
period. p-values for the null hypothesis that purchases and sales are equally likely are reported in the square
brackets below each percentage. Results are reported for 30-day periods relative to the call announcement
date, day 0.
* On NT, significantly different from zero at the .05 level in two-tailed tests. In the “% positive” column,
significantly different from 50% at the .05 level.
** On NT, significantly different from zero at the .01 level in two-tailed tests. In the “% positive” column,
significantly different from 50% at the .01 level.
To gauge how insider purchases surrounding conversion-forcing calls compare
with usual insider trading patterns at these firms, we construct a measure of
abnormal net insider trades following the procedure utilized by Karpoff and
Lee (1991). Using data for each firm i outside the window from 180 days
before the call through 180 days after, we estimate the model
NT(x,x 30) p a  bNT(x 31,x 1)  u (1)i i i i i
for values of x in 30-day increments. For trades by all insiders, ai averages
.44 ( ) across the 247 firms, indicating that insiders are net pur-tp 2.71
chasers of shares on average. For 65% of our firm/calls ai is positive. Fur-
thermore, bi averages .04 ( ) and is positive for 63%, indicating that,tp 2.22
if insiders have been net purchasers (sellers) one month, there is a slight
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TABLE 4 Abnormal Insider Trading Activity Surrounding Conversion-Forcing
Calls of Convertible Bonds
Days Relative to Call
All Insiders All Officers Top Executives
ANT t-Statistic ANT t-Statistic ANT t-Statistic
(180,151) .197 1.135 .249 1.574 .018 .235
(150,121) .078 .456 .093 .692 .098 .964
(120,91) .321 2.036* .368 2.514* .166 1.714
(90,61) .370 1.450 .446 2.028* .254 1.180
(60,31) .493 2.278* .425 2.533* .110 1.164
(30,1) .361 1.503 .553 2.872** .104 1.348
(1,30) .384 2.294* .436 2.726** .236 2.626*
(31,60) .335 1.748 .463 2.799** .138 1.164
(61,90) .121 .751 .122 .764 .013 .099
(91,120) .456 1.800 .217 1.381 .040 .373
(121,150) .271 1.425 .200 1.305 .080 .762
(151,180) .242 1.747 .238 1.707 .088 .884
(90,1) 1.224 2.506* 1.424 3.936** .446 1.819
Number of observations 247 243 209
Note.—We report mean net insider surprise trades, ANT, defined as the number of insider purchases  the
number of insider sales after adjusting for normal insider trading activity at these firms. t-statistics are reported
in parentheses beside each mean. Results are reported for 30-day periods relative to the call announcement
date, day 0.
* Significantly different from zero at the .05 level in two-tailed tests.
** Significantly different from zero at the .01 level in two-tailed tests.
tendency to be net purchasers (sellers) the following month. Equation (1) is
estimated separately for (1) all insiders, (2) officers, and (3) top executives,
providing a forecast, of expectedˆˆ ˆNT(x,x 30) p a  b NT(x 31,x 1) ,i i i i
net insider trades for each 30-day period based on insider activity over the
previous 30 days. We then define net abnormal (or surprise) insider trades,
asANT(x,x 30) ,i
ˆANT(x,x 30) p NT(x,x 30)  NT(x,x 30) . (2)i i i
Mean values of ANTi over all firms i are reported in table 4. As expected,
since insiders were generally net buyers of stock at these firms, the values of
ANT are generally smaller than those of NT. However, the ANT are positive
and significant in most 30-day periods surrounding conversion-forcing calls,
implying that insiders at calling firms are purchasing more equity than normal
during the period before and after calls. For instance, in the 30 days following
the call, we observe positive mean abnormal net purchases that are significant
at the .05 level for insiders in general and top executives and significant at
the .01 level for officers. Over the 90-day period just before the call, ANT
averages 1.224 for insiders in general, 1.424 for officers, and .446 for top
executives. All are significantly greater than zero at the .01 level.
In summary, we find no evidence that managers of calling firms have inside
information that leads them to suspect that their firm’s equity is overvalued.
Indeed, we find exactly the opposite—managers of calling firms are accu-
mulating equity for their own accounts and are even buying more than they
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normally do in the months surrounding the call. The signaling hypothesis is
clearly rejected.
V. Do Stock Analysts View a Conversion-Forcing Call as a Negative
Signal?
Having established that managers making conversion-forcing calls do not view
their firm’s equity as overvalued, we next examine whether informed pro-
fessional outsiders, that is, stock analysts, view a conversion-forcing call as
a negative signal. On the one hand, it seems unlikely that stock analysts would
make this mistake if the managers themselves do not view the equity as
overvalued. On the other hand, this is the very crux of the signaling hypothesis
that a conversion-forcing call sends such a negative signal.
To test whether stock analysts interpret a conversion-forcing call as a neg-
ative signal, we examine whether they tend to lower their forecasts of the
firm’s future earnings following the call. As noted above, several previous
studies have focused on the behavior of actual earnings following conversion-
forcing calls. Ofer and Natarajan (1987) found that actual earnings growth
rates declined sharply following conversion-forcing calls, but Campbell et al.
(1991) argued that this reflected unusually strong earnings growth prior to
the call and that postcall earnings growth simply returned to normal industry
levels. While the behavior of actual earnings is debatable, what is more im-
portant in terms of the signaling hypothesis is whether analysts view a call
as a negative earnings signal, and that is what is tested here.
Several studies have shown that analysts respond to managers’ actions that
they view as revealing new information. For instance, Ederington and Goh
(1998) find that analysts lower their earnings forecasts following bond rating
downgrades, Brous (1992) finds that analysts adjust their forecasts downward
following new equity issue announcements, and Brous and Kini (1993) find
that analysts adjust their forecasts following takeover announcements.
Byrd and Moore (1996) and Shastri and Shastri (1996) have examined
whether analysts lower their earnings forecasts following conversion-forcing
calls as the signaling hypothesis implies and find no evidence that they do
so. Indeed, Byrd and Moore (1996) find that Value Line tends to raise their
earnings forecasts following conversion-forcing calls. In addition to being
based on a larger sample, our analysis extends theirs by examining surprise
or unexpected forecast revisions. This is important because numerous studies
have shown that many analysts revise their forecasts with a substantial lag
and since conversion-forcing calls tend to occur after the firms have done
extremely well, positive forecast revisions would be expected.
For this analysis, we utilize the Institutional Brokers Estimate System
(IBES) data reporting the median of the earnings forecasts for a firm by its
stock analysts each month. For inclusion in our sample, we require that the
IBES tape contain earnings forecasts for the firm from 12 months prior to the
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rating change through 12 months after. Since previous studies have shown
that the IBES tapes contain data errors, we eliminate a firm from our sample
if FRi,t is more than 5 standard deviations (defined over all firms) from the
overall mean in any month. After the initial round of data eliminations, the
standard deviation is recalculated and again firms with observations outside
five standard deviations are eliminated. The resulting data set consists of 278
of our 298 calls. The per share earnings forecasts are adjusted by IBES for
the dilution caused by stock splits, new issues, and conversions.
Like Lys and Sohn (1990), Brous (1992), Ederington and Goh (1998), and
others, we measure the revision during month t of forecasts of firm i’s earnings,
FRi,t, as the change in the median forecast of annual earnings per share deflated
by the stock price. Specifically,
(F  F )i,t i,t1FR p ∗ 100, (3)i,t ∗Pi
where Fi,t is the median analyst earnings forecast (from IBES) as of month t
of firm i’s annual earnings per share for the current fiscal year and is the∗Pi
price per share 1 month prior to the convertible call.13 The t subscript represents
the calendar month relative to the call date. For instance, if firm i calls its
convertible bonds on March 10, then Fi,0 represents the median forecast as of
March and Fi,1 represents the median forecast in February. Note that for
month 0, we do not know which occurred first: the call or the earnings forecast.
Previous studies of earnings forecast revisions by O’Brien (1988), Lys and
Sohn (1990), Brous (1992), Kang, O’Brien, and Sivaramakrishnan (1994),
and Ederington and Goh (1998) have shown that these revisions in earnings
forecasts are partially predictable. Specifically they have documented two
strong tendencies: (1) earnings analysts tend to be overly optimistic initially
and to then lower their forecasts as the earnings release date approaches and
(2) since all analysts do not update their forecasts each month, revisions in
the median earnings forecast tend to be serially correlated, that is, if the median
forecast rises one month due to new information, it will normally continue
to rise in future months as other analysts update. To test whether analysts
respond to conversion-forcing calls, we need a measure of the surprise forecast
revisions after controlling for these two predictable changes.
Our procedure for obtaining a measure of the abnormal or surprise follows
that of Ederington and Goh (1998), who document earnings forecast revisions
following bond rating changes. We first chose 500 firms at random from the
IBES data tape and then chose at random a 25-month period for each firm
13. We normalize the earnings forecasts using the price 1 month prior to the forecast revision
to avoid picking up price changes caused by the conversion-forcing call. Fi,t and Fi,t1 always
represent forecasts for the same fiscal year. For instance, suppose that the nearby forecasts in
January and February are for the 1989 fiscal year while March’s is for the 1990 fiscal year. In
that case FRi,t is calculated for February using the January and February forecasts for 1989
earnings while March’s is calculated using the February and March forecasts of 1990 earnings.
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between 1/84 and 12/90. Using this pooled data, we estimated the following
equation using a third-order Almon lag (t-values in parentheses):
FR p .1265 .1051FR  .0958FR  .0861FRi,t i,t1 i,t2 i,t3
(15.20) (21.20) (35.72) (27.21)
 .0760FR  .0654FR  .0545F, (4)i,t4 i,t5
(24.04) (24.23) (10.83)
where the FRi,t are as defined in equation (3) above. The significant negative
intercept of .1265 confirms that, ceteris paribus, analysts tend to reduce
their forecasts over time. The significant coefficients on the lagged FR terms
confirm the finding that, ceteris paribus, upward (downward) revisions in the
median forecast tend to be followed by further upward (downward) forecast
revisions as more analysts update. For instance, the .1 coefficient for FRi,t1
indicates that a doubling of the median forecast one month tends to be followed
by an increase of approximately 10% the following month.
Using equation (4) and past values of FR, we calculate the expected forecast
revision, for each firm i. We then define the abnormalE(FR FFR , jp 1,6)i,t i,tj
(or surprise) earnings forecast revision, AFRi,t, as the difference between the
actual revision in the median forecast in month t and this expected forecast
revision, specifically
AFR p FR  E(FR FFR , jp 1,6). (5)i,t i,t i,t i,tj
The resulting mean values of AFR are reported in table 5.14 As shown there,
contrary to the signaling hypothesis, positive abnormal revisions in analysts’
earnings forecasts are observed in all the months surrounding conversion-
forcing calls. Most are significant. Interestingly, the largest surprise forecast
revision, .103, occurs in the month of the conversion-forcing call. This
certainly conflicts with the hypothesis that a conversion-forcing call is bad
news.
While significantly different from zero, the implied surprise forecast re-
visions are small. For instance, for a stock with a P/E ratio of 21 (the average
in our sample), the .103 AFR in the month of the call implies an upward
revision in the median forecast of 2.2%. There is also no evidence of a change
in analyst behavior after the call; small positive abnormal forecasts revisions
are observed in the months prior to a conversion-forcing call, and small
positive forecast revisions are observed afterward.
In summary, there is no evidence that earnings analysts interpret a con-
version-forcing call as bad news. Indeed there is evidence that, relative to
firms in general, analysts are revising their earnings forecasts upward in the
months surrounding conversion-forcing calls. This is consistent with the ev-
idence on actual earnings by Campbell et al. (1991) but inconsistent with that
14. The mean FRs before applying eq. (5) are generally small, insignificant, and of mixed
sign.
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TABLE 5 Abnormal Earnings Forecast Revisions Before and After Conversion-
Forcing Calls of Convertible Bonds
Month Relative to Call Mean AFRi,t t-Value
6 .096 3.37*
5 .094 4.57**
4 .084 3.87**
3 .092 3.74**
2 .082 3.36**
1 .083 2.84**
Call month .103 3.03**
1 .061 2.52*
2 .093 5.36**
3 .016 .47
4 .101 4.60**
5 .077 3.28**
6 .039 .99
Number of observations 266–78 249–65
Note.—The mean over all calling firms i of the abnormal, or surprise, forecast revisions, AFR pI,t
is reported. FRi,t is the revision in analysts’ forecasts for firm i measured as:FR E(FR FFR , jp 1,6)i,t i,t i,tj
where FI,t is the median analyst forecast in month t of earnings per share for the∗ ∗FR p [(F -F )/P ] 100,i,t i,t i,t1 i
current fiscal year, and is the price per share 1 month prior to the call date. is the∗P E(FR FFR , jp 1,6)i i,t i,tj
expected forecast revision in month t based on a 6-month distributed lag of past forecast revisions.
* Significantly different from zero at the .05 level in two-tailed tests.
** Significantly different from zero at the .01 level in two-tailed tests.
in Ofer and Natarajan (1985) and provides a more direct test of the signaling
hypothesis than either.
VI. Conclusions
Like many previous studies, we find that an announcement of a conversion-
forcing call of a firm’s convertible bonds is accompanied by a small decline
in the price of the firm’s common equity. The widely accepted explanation
for this phenomenon is that market participants interpret a conversion-forcing
call as signaling that the firm’s management views a future decline in the
value of the firm as likely and want to force bondholders to share in this
decline.
Our evidence contradicts this explanation in that we find no evidence that
managers of calling firms view the firms’ future prospects negatively (indeed,
we find exactly the opposite) and no evidence that a conversion-forcing call
is interpreted as bad news by outside professionals. Before, during, and after
conversion-forcing calls, the firm’s managers are active purchasers of stock
for their own portfolios. Indeed, they purchase more stock than normal in the
months before and after conversion-forcing convertible bond calls. We also
find no evidence that a call is interpreted negatively by those outsiders who
follow the firm most closely, its analysts. In particular, there is no evidence
that they lower their earnings forecasts following conversion-forcing calls as
they do after other announcements such as new issue announcements and
bond downgrades. In fact, we find evidence of small positive surprise revisions
in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Thus, our evidence supports the hypothesis of
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Mazzeo and Moore (1992) and Byrd and Moore (1996) that the price decline
following conversion-forcing calls is a liquidity-induced transitory decline
that is quickly and totally reversed—a reversal that we also document.
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